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An Approach to the Analysis of Joint V e n t u r e s .
Neil Kay, Jean-Philippe Robe and Patrizia Zagnoli
0 Introduction.
In recent years, the joint venture (JV) has emerged as 
a major issue in corporate governance and industrial 
organisation. While the organisational form itself is not a 
recent invention, it is its relatively recent growth in
numbers and significance that has encouraged analysts and
2
policy makers to pay closer attention to the phenomenon .
However, analysis in this area has encountered rea. 
difficulties, both at the theoretical and empirical level. 
To some extent, this reflects complexity and variety in the 
phenomenon itself ; JVs can adopt many forms with different 
degrees of parental involvement, and even definitions as to 
what constitutes a JV are not always consistent. 
Nevertheless, even after allowing for such factors, there 
remain analytical and conceptual difficulties in the 
literature that have hindered further development.
For example, it is not sufficient to explain the recent 
growth in JV agreements as a simple consequence of a 12
1. Neil Kay is senior lecturer in the Department of 
Economics at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh; Jean- 
Philippe Robe is researcher in the Department of Law at 
European University Institute in Florence; Patrizia Zagnoli 
is researcher in the Department of Economics at European 
University Institute in Florence.
2. For instance the JV per year table developed by K. 
Harrigan (1986) shows the jump in the number of JVs in the 
U.S. between 1980 (63 JVs) and 1983 (269 JVs). While Teece 
(1987) affirms that col lab', r at ion is, of course, nothing 
new, what is new is the frequency with which collaboration 





























































































concomitant growth in opportunities for such agreements. 
There are, at least in principle, always alternatives to JV 
organisation as far as exploitation of these opportunities 
is concerned. Analysis should explain why the JV in 
particular has emerged so strongly in certain sectors in 
recent years3 compared to, say, merger or licensing 
alternatives.
3. A useful source of recent data on the phenomenon is the 
FOR (Formazione Organizzazione Risorse) Montedison Data Base 
on inter-firm agreements between firms in the market economy 
industrialized countries. Between 1982 and 1985 531, JVs are 
registered with the following distribution per sector using 
Pavitt Taxonomy (1984):
- science based sectors 73.4%
- specialized equipment
supplier 12.9%
- scale intensive 11.8%
- supplier dominated 1.3%
Total 100.0%
The heavy concentration of JVs in the science based sectors 
enphasizes the role of JV 's as a device for exploiting 
technological knowledge, either in exchange for
complementary technological knowledge from partners, or for 
other complementary resources such as marketing and 
distribution (Mowery, 1986; Teece, 1986). Some sectors like 
commercial aircraft, robotic equipment, telecommunication 
equipment, etc, are characterized by the requirement for 
extensive investments in marketing and product support. Some 
others like chemicals or pharmaceuticals are characterized 
by technology barriers in particular fields of research that 
cannot be easily overcome by firms even if they are involved 
in complementary and/or similar products. Sometimes, in 
these sectors, the research path to follow in order to reach 
a positive commercial outcome is too long, risky and costly 




























































































A similar problem is encountered with many of the 
explanations of JV activity which regard the JV as a means 
of facilitating resource exchange, especially for economies 
of scale reasons or to put together complementary assets. 
This explanation is reasonable as far as it goes, and, in 
the literature, there is strong empirical support for this 
supposed relationship. However, it does raise other 
questions ; for example, why should not other objectives be 
pursued by JV activity ? Mergers in the post-war period 
frequently pursued a conglomerate strategy ; since JV is an 
alternative form of economic organisation to merger, why 
should it not also mimic merger strategies of conglomeration 
as well as merger strategies built around exploitation of 
economies ? Is it because conglomerate strategies in general 
are no longer fashionable, or is there something particular 
to the conglomerate strategy that makes it more likely to be 
pursued by merger than by JV ?
Another example of an .ssue that has proved 
problematical is whether JVs are more likely to contribute 
to efficiency through economies, or to inefficiency, by 
facilitating collusive behaviour and concentration of power. 
In principle, JVs profitability could be attributable to 
either source, Data limitations and the typically 




























































































to analyse, despite its obvious importance for policy 
makers.
In this paper, we develop an approach that we hope is 
useful in analysing these and other issues in this area. In 
the next section, we start by using a simple example to make 
some general hypotheses concerning JVs. Next, we argue that 
JVs should be analysed in a comparative institutional 
framework, and that this perspective may be usefully joined 
with the general propositions of the previous section to 
generate some interesting insights into the possible nature 
and implications of JV activity. We then set this in a 
historical context by relating joint venturing to the 
broader problem of the evolution and development of the 
modern corporation. We finish with an examination of 
existing empirical studies, dealing with the extent to which 
available empirical analyses are relevant to our analysis.
1 Market & Hierarchy in Joint Venture Activity
First of all we need to clarify 
underlying our considerations. JV is 
activity whose stock is owned by
the definition of JV 
a form of economic 



























































































corporations that jointly promote the creation of a separate 
operating entity, where each partner makes a substantial 
contribution in the form of capital and technology, 
marketing experience, personal and physical assets. For our 
purposes Brodley (1982) provides a working definition; "an 
integration of operations between two or more separate 
firms, in which the following conditions are present : (1) 
the enterprise is under the joint control of the parent 
firms, which are not under related control; (2) each parent 
makes a substancial contribution to the joint enterprise ; 
(3) the enterprise exists as a business entity separate from 
its parents ; and (4) the JC creates significant new 
enterprise capability in terms of new production capacity, 
new technology, a new product or entry into a new market."
It means that we do not consider in our definition 
other forms of industrial cooperation like collaborative and 
cooperative agreements in R&D, cross-licencing, 
franchising, etc., that have only contractual control since 




























































































equity ownership . Nor is financial participation 
sufficient to classify an activity as JV for our purposes, 
since JV as interpreted above requires deeper parental 
involvement and contribution to the resources and the 
decision making process of the child.
In order to establish a basis for discussion of issues and 
problems in this area, we shall start with a simple example 
of a JV and use this to develop propositions which will be 
useful to our subsequent analysis.
Suppose we have a technologist (T) who has invented a 
new product that can be produced and assembled by a 4
4. Such a definition is consistent with Stuckey's (1983). 
Intepretation of JV as providing in the newly created 
entity, the capacity to pursue the goals that induced the 
partnership, and is similar to definitions by Harrigan 
(1984) and Killing (1980).
In some of the literature on the multinational enterprise, 
JVs are defined as all the foreign subsidiaries where the 
mother company own less than 100 of the equity (Dunning and 
Cantwell 1982). A joint subsidiary is basically a company in 
which the bulk of the stock is owned by two or more parent 
companies; thus it represents a distinct type of corporate 
enterprise and differs from a simple subsidiary. According 
to Boyle (1961) JVs and Joint subsidiaries are 
interchangable. More widely, JVs are defined as traditional 
foreign investment where there is at least one local partner 
(Stopford and Wells, 1972). Other authors argue that it is 
possible to speak of JVs only in the cases of operating JV, 
excluding passive financial investments made by parties not 
involved in the new entity's strategic business decisions 
(Caves, 1982; Harrigan, 1986), a position more consistent 



























































































technical group (t). We also have a marketing expert (M) who 
could market and distribute this product with the help of a 
sales/distribution team (m). For simplicity, we assume each 
are independent organisations, at least to start with, and 
that the time and resources of t and m will be fully devoted 
to this activity. In these circumstances, there are a 
variety of forms of economic organisation that may be 
adopted, summarized below in these main types :
CONTRACT
0 — !“ lt
«
t i i m ' 
Figure 1(a)
FIRM JOINT VENTURE
Figure 1(b) Figure 1(c)
HIERARCHY
Market agreement: —  —  ----- —
Hierarchical relationship: . A A ^ V ,'N‘/
Figure 1 : Forms of Economic Organisations
The three main types of economic organisation we 
identify here are : contract, firm and joint venture. We 




























































































two as hierarchical forms. The reasons for this 
classification will be discussed further below.
There are many possible varieties of the contractual 
form. For example, T might sub-contract production and 
assembly to t, license M to sell the product, and M might 
pay m to sell and distribute the product on a fee or 
commission basis. The different contractual arrangements 
preserve the organisational identity and independence of the 
respective units. This is illustrated in Figure 1(a).
Alternatively, co-ordination of activity may be carried 
out by merging all units into one firm. This is represented 
in Figure 1(b). In this case, we assume TM are the 
owners/senior management, while tm are lower level 
subordinates within this simple hierarchy.
The third main type illustrated above is JV - in Figure 
1(c). We assume for convenience T and M enter into a 50/50 
JV agreement, represented by the dotted line in figure 1, 
and that tm carry out the instructions passed down from 
their T and M superiors. The JV agreement thus creates a 
dual line of command as illustrated in Figure 1.
In practice, JV agreements can take many forms, and the 
actual agreements and hierarchical arrangements will vary 
from case to case.
Even if we cannot deal with all possible varieties of 




























































































based on the above discussion concerning JVs that we hope 
have a reasonable level of generality. While accepting that 
there will be exceptions and qualifications, the
propositions will be helpful in placing JV in the wider 
context of corporate and industrial development.
(1) The JV is an intermediate form of economic organisation,
seen in market exchange terms. This is probably a fairly 
straightforward and uncontroversial point. The JV 
agreement will typically be more limited and less
detailed compared to the network of contractual 
arrangements involved In the market system of Figure 
1(a). However, the agreement itself means it retains some 
market features compared to the internalized hierarchy of 
the firm in Figure 1(b). In this respect, it is an 
intermediate form of economic organisation from the point 
of view of market exchange.
(2) The JV is an extreme form of economic organisation seen 
in hierarchical terms. As far as the extent and form of 
hierarchical arrangements and implied administrative 
costs are concerned, the JV is the most complex form of 
hierarchy in Figure 1. If the choice is between firm and 
JV in Figure 1, the JV agreement does not trade off




























































































rather the opposite ; the additional market exchange 
features have to be supported and augmented by additional 
hierarchical features involved in the dual command 
system.
(3) The JV is best analysed as complex hierarchy. This is a 
crucial point and is related to the first two 
propositions. Our analysis would suggest that it would be 
a mistake to interpret the JV as an intermediate, 
possibly transitional form, lying somewhere within some 
undefined spectrum between pure market exchange at one 
end and unified corporate organisation at the other. Its 
hybrid nature should not be allowed to conceal the fact 
that is the most complex form of economic organisation 
illustrated in figure 1, market exchange elements 
supplementing dual command complex hierarchy. 4
(4) The JV should be analysed in comparative institutionnal 
terms. It is a mistake to analyse the JV in isolation; 
its existence must be justified in terms of why in a 
given situation this form of economic organisation is 
adopted rather than alternative forms. Since there are 
usually a variety of institutionnal alternatives 
available for the conduct of a particular economic 




























































































For example, institutional choice in Figure 1 could be 
framed in opportunity cost terms. The adoption of a JV 
structure in this example has opportunity costs in the 
form of the net benefits that would have occurred had the 
cheapest alternative organisational form been adopted 
instead. A casual interpretation of Figure 1 suggests 
that the complexity and implicit costliness of the JV 
with respect to its institutional alternatives would 
result in it being chosen only in unusual circumstances. 
It is to consideration of what these circumstances might 
be, and their implication for the nature of JV activity, 
that we turn in the next section.
2 Improbability, Interference, and Joint Venture Activity
The picture painted of JV organisation in the previous 
section suggests that in general it is likely to be a lowly 
rated and hence improbable form of economic organisation. 
Certainly in our example above, contract and firm 
alternatives appear to offer simpler and clearer 
alternatives. This is supported by Brodley (1982) " managers 
typically prefer single-firm projects...and undertake joint 
ventures only after extensive negotiation (p.1529)", while




























































































disadvantage to merger that JV avoids. Our discussion above 
provide an analytical framework that helps justify such 
statements.
We propose that analysis of JV activity would be 
facilitated by following a two stage argument : Stage 1 
should consider why hierarchy rather than market exchange 
may be preferable in certain circumstances. There has been a 
great deal of theoretical and empirical work in this area in 
recent years, providing both analytical tools and evidence 
of actual behaviohr. Stage 2 should analyse why, when a 
hierarchical alternative may be preferred, 
alternative is chosen. It is this stage that we shall be 




shall pursue the line that there must be some barriers to 
internalisation within a single firm as in 1(b) in Fig.l.
In general, our argument derives from conceptions of
interference regarding the effective functioning of
institutional forms. In Stage 1, transaction costs may
impede the operation of market exchange agreement,
encouraging the adoption of a hierarchical alternative. In 
Stage 2, there exist barriers to adoption of single firm 
internalisation strategies that result in the JV strategy 
being pursued. Thus, for analytical convenience, we presume 
firms's choice of institutional form follow a lexicographic 



























































































adopted if significant barriers the operation of
simpler market and organisational forms as in 1(a) and 1(b) 
in Fig.l. Analysing the decision process in this fashion 
allows us to concentrate on stage 2 choices ? we believe 
this is the relevant area for analysis of JVs, Stage 1 
analysis being relatively well developed already. 
Consequently, below we suggest a number of Stage 2 problems 
that may encourage JV activity following from our analysis.
2.1 Stage 2 Barriers Facilitating Joint Venture Activity
We shall presume that Stage 1 interference problems
have encouraged adopt ion of a hierarchical alternative.
There are a number of barriers to single firm
internalisât ion that may in turn encourage Stage 2 JV
selection.
(1) Forced partnership. The most direct barrier to 1(b) type 
of single firm internalisation is government resistance 
to multinational expansion, especially in third world 



























































































ownership of local ventures and may require an overseas 





(2) Concentration. Concentrated markets may force firms to 
seek JV partners, especially if further merger or 
internal growth to exploit particular venture 
opportunities runs the risk of attracting the attention 
of the anti-trust authorities. Even here, anti-trust 
policy may influence the type of JV being pursued. For 
example, U.S. antitrust statutes present barriers to 
domestic- firms combining their assets and activities not 
only in-the form of merger but also as domestic JVs in 
order, for instance, to combine their research talents. 
Consequently, antitrust policy has been cited as a
5. The strict political control of some countries in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia on foreign investment obliges the 
industries that want to invest there to enter into a 
partnership with a local company. In some countries like 
Morocco and Senegal, for instance, to benefit from fiscal 
and financial advantages the foreign investor has to start a 
business with a local partner firm. In Saudi Arabia one of 
the major markets of the Middle East, it is necessary to 
activate a local "key" to enter: e.g. the JV 40/60% between 
Cit-Alcatei, the French telecommunications company, with 
Beta Company, a public Saudi Arabian company in order to 
sell and install the public and private telephone network. 
Recently, important potential markets in the communist 
world, including China and U.S.S.R., have opened up to 





























































































exacerbates these problems even further. Figure 2 
illustrates probable difficulties.
Firm 1 Firm 2
M= Market link.
T= Technology link.
Figure 2 ; Diversification Strategies
Figure 2 illustrates two diversified firms both having



























































































technology links between them^. For example, division A of 
the first firm has a market link with division B, possibly 
in the form of shared advertising, sales and distribution 
networks. In turn, division B has technology links with two 
other divisions, possibly in the form of shared R&D. Both 
firms also perceive potential efficiency gains through 
collaboration. Division B of the first firm and division Q 
of the second firm could help create a new business as
indicated by the dotted circle. A could supply marketing 
^skills and Q could supply technology.
The sledgehammer-craking-nut barrier to a merger
solution associated with size mismatch problems holds even 
more strongly when both firms are highly diversified as in 
Figure 2 above. A merger to exploit the A/Q collaborative
A
possibility would create a very complex and potentially 
cumbersome entity. Welding together such diversified systems
A
into a coherent organisation is liable to be costly, time
consuming and even impossible. The variety and complexity of 
linkages create administrative problems that are likely to 
be augmented by different corporate traditions and 
histories. Even if the firms are diversified along roughly
7. The technique of mapping strategy in this fashion is 





























































































similar lines, differences in firms' cultures and procedures 
can pose formidable obstacles to effective organisational 
integration.
Therefore, diversification poses strong barriers to 
exploitation of A/Q type opportunities due to problems of 
integrating complex systems with differentiated cultures and 
backgrounds. A JV solution here permits exploitation of the 
A/Q opportunity without damaging the integrity and coherence 
of the respective partners' operations, and avoiding the 
sledgehammer effect of a merger solution. J
In fact, there is another consequence of diversification 
that may actively facilitate JV operation, the diversified 
firm is more likely to adopt an M-Form as opposed to a U- 
Form structure (Williamson 1985), and there are possible 
reasons why this organisational structure is more 
appropriate for JV activity.
Once a divisionalised M-Form structure is adopted, JV 
activity is easier to initiate and sustain than is the case 
in the functionally specialised U-Form. Divisionalisation 
creates natural decision units organised around product 
process or territory. The U-Form structure is not well 
designed for JVs since the appropriate functional skills for 
a specific venture will be (scattered in different functional 
































































































By way of contrast, middle-level divisional managers in the 
M-Form are more likely to have relevant skills and resources 
directly under their control, facilitating co-ordination and 
control of relevant functions at product-market level. Not 
only do they have control of key assets,they are well placed
to assess asset déficiences or weaknesses that JV partners 
may compensate for. Further, the logic of M-Form operation
leads to the creation of an internal capital market in which ,
S I
quasi-autonomous divisions compete for funds with each other
/  C ^ T
on a performance basis (Williamson 1975). Such internal 
competition may encourage individual divisional managers to 
seek external alliances, such as in JVs, in attempting to
f fj
compete against divisional peers.
Therefore the decentralized operation of the M-form 
corporation may facilitate the pursuit of JV activity. 
Divisional product-market specialisation means divisional 
managers are likely to have the strategic overview and 
direct control of relevant resources necessary for JV 
activity, while the decoupling effect of the internal 
capital market and inter-division competition may facilitate 
and encourage independent divisional action in this area. 
Consequently, not only may diversification directly 



























































































indirectly through the creation of M-for structures to




Figure 3 - Diversification, the M-Form and JV Activity.
Thus, size, diversification and the adoption of M-forms 
structures are each liable to be mutually reinforcing 
pressures leading to the formation of JV activity.
3 The Growth of Firms and the Nature of Joint Venture 
Act ivity
Our analysis of Stage 2 barriers to 1(b) type solutions 
results in a fairly consistent picture of corporate growth 
and development, and the role of the JV in this process. If 































































































U-Form firms, then market exchange agreements are an obvious 
vdevice for the exploitation of venture opportunities. Stage 
1 transaction cost problems may create pressure for 
internalisation within a hierarchy, for reasons discussed 
earlier. Unless there are barriers to 1(b) type solutions, 
firms will prefer to grow by internal growth or merger. 
Scale, market concentration, diversification,
multinationalism and M-Form structures may all result from 
this process of 1(b) internalisation. As we have seen, the 
first four of these aspects of corporate growth create 
barriers to further 1(b) internalisation that may result in 
the adoption of the least prefered option, the JV, while the 
last (the M-Form) actually facilitates JV formation.
Seen in this light, the evolution and proliferation of 
JV activity in recent years becomes comprehensible, even 
inevitable. The corporation seeking venture opportunities 
will internalise if transaction costs pressure it to do so, 
but eventually internal growth and merger create larger and 
more complex systems that generate barriers to further 
pursuit of venture opportunities by this route. Growth 
generates its own limits. Persistent and sustained growth by
r
the corporation will inevitably lead to it (knocking against 
one or more of the barriers to 1(b) solutions discussed in 
the previous section. At some point these pressures will 





























































































opportunity for further expansion and exploitation of 
venture opportunities.
Consequently, the JV is an activity that will tend to 
evolve naturally in the more advanced stages in a maturing 
industrial economy. Our interpretation of lexicographic 
institutional preferences is consistent with the relative 
absence of JV activity until relatively recently. Our 
analysis also suggest that the recent wave of JV activity is 
not a &  ; the barriers to 1(b) internalisation are
structural and likely to provide continuing pressure for JV 
act ivity.
As well as relating the JV to the development processes 
of firms and industries, there are a number of specific 
propositions concerning the nature of JVs themselves that 
our analysis suggests. The five propositions below all 
relate to what a JV is typically not designed to do. In each 
case the propositions may generate testable hypotheses. 
After discussing each propositions we shall look at what JV 
activity is likely to be designed to achieve.
(1) JV activity is unlikely between firms in atomistic 
markets. This is because such markets are unlikely to 
face barriers to internal growth or merger exploitation 



























































































as a last resort only when growth creates Stage 2 
barriers of the type discussed in the previous section.
At least one firm should be large, diversified and/or
8
have a significant market share .
(2) JV is not for market power. Our argument suggest that JV 
is unlikely to be pursued for monopolistic reasons. If 
firms wish to collude, say in pricing, there are easier 
and cheaper methods. As we have seen, JV is an extremely 
costly and cumbersome device of last resort which is 
likely to be more appropriate for efficiency gains than 
for monopolistic control. This conflicts with the views 
of Adams (1985) who argues that JVs have become in recent 
years partial consolidations or quasi-mergers, 
substituting competition with co-operation.
(3) JV is not a transitional strategy. By transitional, in 
this context, we mean the JV is not a stepping stone to 
full scale merger between partners. If a merger is a 
possibility to start with, it would be pursued rather 
than the complex hierarchical alternative of JVs. It is a 
mistake to see the hybrid nature of the JV as implying it 
is intermediate between market exchange and merger. As we 8
8. Though this does not preclude the possibility of 




























































































have seen, the JV is a more complex hierarchy than is the 
case with unitary form alternative.
(4) JVs will tend to have relatively short lives. Ceteris 
paribus, the longer the expected life of a proposed 
venture between two firms, the more likely a merger is to 
be adopted as a solution. Using the sledgehammer/nut
analogy againi, the longer the life of the prtrjëct, the
larger the nut (venture present value)i- and the more
likely that the s edgehammer of merger will be an
appropriate solution. JVs will be more likely to be
restricted to the regions of shorter expected venture 
lives (lower present value, and smaller nuts).
This is an interesting proposition since it suggests 
there is an ex ante selection device biasing JVs towards 
limited life spans, rather than limited JV life span 
being attributable to ex post failure, as in some 
analyses.
(5) JVs do not adopt conglomerate strategies. We have 
suggested that mergers and JVs are in principle 
alternatives. Much merger activity in the post-war period 
was for conglomerate reasons. Why should not JVs also be 





























































































Figure 4 : Conglomerate Joint Venture
Suppose we have two conglomerates A and B. The 
conglomerate strategy is represented above by each of 
their respective divisions having no market or
technological links between them. There is also a 
possible venture, V, indicated by the dotted circle. It 
has no potential market or technological links with 
either A or B.
We are not concerned here with why the firms wish to
9
pursue and extend a conglomerate strategy . The point is 
that extensi£n-of the conglomerate strategy is typically 
simple and, straightforward with few barriers to 1(b) type 
internalisation since divisions operate on an individual 9
9. But see Williamson (1975) and Kay (1982) for analysis of 



























































































profit center basis. Senior management do not have to try 
to integrate the mass of complex interlinkages implied in 
a two firm merger in Figure 2. Even if the two 
corporations here were to merge, there would be few 
cultural and organisational clashes since individual 
businesses would be largely separate, the major linkage 
at senior level being the balance sheet. Market 
concentration would also be unaffected by a genuine 
conglomerate merger. Thus, if firms, for some reason, 
wish to extend their conglomerate sphere of operations, 
1(b) solutions are relatively straightforward and there 
appear no obvious reasons to turn to the device of last 
resort, the JV. Consequently, JV activity is unlikely to 
porsue a conglomerate strategy since there are typically 
few barriers to simpler institutional alternatives.
4 Empirical Evidence on JV Activity.
We turn now to an examination of the results obtained in 
previous empirical studies to consider whether or not they 
are consistent with our framework of analysis. The fact that 




























































































complicates the interpretation of empirical results, and 
reduces the significance of any isolated finding. However,
what matters here is whether or not the picture constructed 
earlier is broadly supported, as a whole, by previous 
empirical works on JV.
Two areas have to be covered by our review. Firstly, we 
will examine evidence for the role of barriers to single 
firm internalization as a stimulus to JV activity. Secondly, 
we examine evidence relating to the hypotheses made earlier 
concerning the nature of JV activity.
Concerning the barriers to single firm internalization, 
S.V. Berg and P. Friedman, in their 1978 survey of JV in 
American industry confirm that if any cooperation between 
two firms in the same industry attracts antitrust attention, 
"there is evidence that horizontal JVs are viewed as safer 
than full horizontal mergers". Their explanation of the 
fact that sixty-two percent of the JVs by basic chemical
firms from 1966 to 1973 where horizontal while only thirty-
10
eight percent of the mergers were horizontal . This 
tends to corroborate our argument that concentration will 
tend to encourage JV activity. In a 1976 article, J. Pfeffer 10




























































































and P. Nowak had contested that JV should receive a less 
stringent treatment than mergers from the part of antitrust 
authorities. Finding the proportion of horizontal parent- 
pairings to be positively correlated with child industry 
concentration, they concluded that corporate joint ventures 
tend to be anticompetitive instruments. It was clear for 
them that the numerical importance of JV in concentrated 
markets was a evidence of their use to secure monopoly 
advantages. In fact, it has been shown afterwards that it is 
firm size rather than concentration which determines the 
extent and incidence of JV activity^, the concentration 
measures providing a positive correlation with JV activity
only because of a link through the size of firms in an 
12industry . Also J.D. Hlavacek and V.A. Thompson had already 
concluded their 1976 study of the JV approach to technology 
utilization by stating that they are new, rational 12
11. Berg-Friedman (1980) p.164.
12. Berg-Friedman (1980) pp.156-157. Interstingly, although
Berg and Friedman 's empirical findings concerning the size 
of firm effect are consistent with our expectations, their
theoretical explanation for the relationship is quite
different. We argue that size of firm is important because 
it increases barriers to the merger alternatives for 
exploitation of the region of common interest; Berg and 
Friedman argue instead that size of firm generates capital 
economies to fund JVs and enables the larger firm to engage 
in multiple JVs. We prefer to retain our explanation because 
it is simpler, parsimonious, and consistent with a wider 




























































































creations, the result of objective analysis of a technical- 
commercial opportunity rather than adaptation to market or
the antitrust authorities have demonstrated that JV can
14
sometimes be used in restraint of trade , evidence exists 
now that JVs are not anticompetitive instruments per se, a 
result consistent with what we expected given its 
demonstrated complexity. Their predominance in concentrated 
markets should not allow for an interpretation of JV as
frequently given but rejected by Berg and Frideman, after a 
rate-of-return analysis of JV13 456.
That size is the most important single factor for JV 
creation is also claimed by S.E. Boyle, whose early study 
of JV's having at least one parent among the Fortune 500 
showed that joint subsidiary participation increases as the 
size of firm increases. For example, firms classified among 
the 100 largest manufacturing corporations were identified 
as parent corporations in 42% of the cases, whereas the 100 
smaller firms of the list appeared as parents in only 4% of 
the cases16. Also, "the larger the company, the more likely
13. Hlavacek-Thompson (1976) p.35.
14. See Brodley (1982).
15. Berg-Friedman (1979) p.18.
16. Boyle (1968) p.85.
13
competitive forces . If some important cases in front of



























































































it is to be involved in many joint subsidiaries" , a result 
which is consistent with our size argument, but also with 
the diversification one, the larger the firm, the more 
likely it is to be diversified. Boyle observed also that 
joint subsidiaries themselves tend to be small manufacturing 
companies, while the parents are more often the contry's 
largest firms^ , giving support to our size and cultural 
mismatch arguments. More empirical studies are needed here, 
especially from the point of view of separating out effects 
of size and diversification, and also with respect to the 
role of the M-Form in stimulating JV activity.
That JV are not used as transitional, intermediary 
structures preceding merger is evidenced by Berg and
Friedman's study of the cases of termination of chemical JVs 
19between 1924 and 1969 . In 50 cases of termination studied,
only 2 were due to a parent merging into the other. In the 
48 remaining cases, those which were not due to financial 
failure (20 cases) or an antitrust settlement (4 cases), 
were the result of a purchase by one parent (22 cases), by a 
third party (4 cases) or the result of a merger of the JV 
into another JV by same parents. So there seems to be a
17. Boyle (1968) p.92.
18. Boyle (1968) p.87.




























































































tendency for JVs to be transformed into some other 
organizational form after a few years of operation, but not 
to be a step toward merger of the parents.
Simultaneously, Berg and Friedman notice the relatively 
short lives of JVs, but stress the fact that the absorption
of the JV by one parent doesn't necessarily mean that the JV
20 21 failed . If JVs are not without risks , "some terminations
reflect not the "financial failure" of the JV, but rather
the advent of new areas of investment of higher potencial
returns for at least one of the parents".
Finally, with regard to the inappropriatness of the use 
of JV in atomistic markets or for conglomerate strategy. 
There is little empirical evidence adressing these points 
directly. However, the evidence consistently points out the 
important role of size and complementary assets in 
stimulating JV activity, providing "2ft— least indirect
evidence that atomistic markets and conglomerate strategy 
respectively do not appear to have a major impact on the 
formation of JVs.
Therefore, bearing in mind that the technical 
definitions and empirical orientation of the studies
surveyed are not always entirely consistent with our own.
20. Berg-Friedman (1979) p.10.




























































































the overall emerging picture of JV activity is broadly 
supportive of our framework. The JV does appear to be more 
closely associated with concentrated markets, and while this 
may be more directly due to size firm effects, it does not 
appear to be typically for market power objectives, and does 
indicate its likely reduced relevance in atomistic markets 
where merger alternatives are still regular propositions. We
diversification and M-form effects and further research may 
shed some light on these inter-relationships. Indirect 
support for low rating of conglomerate motives in JV 
activity is provided by the regular citing of complementary 
assets as a prime motive for JV formation, but further 
research is needed here also as to whether or not it has 
been less frequent in JV then in merger activity. Further, 
the fundamentally temporary nature of much JV activity is 
consistent with our expectations, as is the tendency for it 
not to be a stepping stone to eventual parent merger.
5 Conclus ions.
Starting from a comparative institutional perspective 
we have developed a simple interpretation of JV activity
also believe the size of firm effect




























































































Our framework generates a consistent and comprehensive 
account of JV activity by analysing the implications of JVs 
extremely complex and potentially .costly hierarchial 
structure. Its role as an institutional device of last 
resort has been highlighted, facilitating systematic 
analysis of the generation and incidence of JV activity.
It has allowed JV activity to be placed in a historical 
context as a natural, even inevitable, phase of corporate 
evolution. Not only has this framework permitted us to tie 
together a variety of empirical findings with associated 
policy implications in a coherent fashion, it has also 
signposted current gaps and deficiences in empirical 
analysis of the JV. Consequently it also serves to orientate 
useful possible research directions concerning the nature of 
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